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O

tto von Bismarck is reported to
have said that laws are like sausages;
it is better not to see them made. And
like sausages, legislation is improved by
quality ingredients. Rigorous research
can be a vital ingredient that improves
the final policy and legislative product.
The use of research to shape legislative
development, however, should not be
assumed. A forthcoming book published
by the Upjohn Institute, Solving the
Reemployment Puzzle: From Research
to Policy (Wandner 2010), traces the use
and misuse of research as it informed
and guided workforce public policy
during the Clinton and George W. Bush
presidencies. (To order the book, see the
order form on the back cover or visit
www.upjohn.org).
The new book closely examines the
process by which eight social science
experiments changed workforce
development laws and policies. The
experiments are analyzed through
their entire policy process: experiment
initiation, implementation, and evaluation;
policy development; legislative
enactment; program development; and
program implementation.
The experiments all examined ways to
return to work dislocated workers eligible
to collect unemployment insurance
(UI); hence, they were called the “UI
Experiments.”
The UI Experiments resulted in
policy proposals and federal legislation
despite a hostile economic, fiscal, and
political environment. In some ways, they
succeeded because they anticipated and
surmounted the difficult environment of
the 1980s.
The experiments operated under at
least three important environmental
constraints. First, they were developed
during the early and mid-1980s, a period
of high unemployment. Thus, there
was a clear need to help the long-term
unemployed return to work.

Second, the experiments were
conducted during a period of budget
stringency. Conscious of fiscal
constraints, the researchers designed
the experiments to test whether the
treatments could provide net benefits to
the U.S. Department of Labor to enhance
the chances that they could be enacted.
Third, the experiments operated in
a partisan environment both within
Congress and between Congress and the
executive branch. Experimental methods
were used precisely in order to yield
rigorous results that all parties would find
convincing, since evaluations based on
experimental methods are more likely to
satisfy policymakers, regardless of their

Between 1986 and 1996, eight
UI Experiments were conducted,
searching for new or improved
interventions that might
expedite workers’ return to
work and improve their skills.
political philosophy. These methods are
especially important in a time of divided
and contentious government in order to
enact into federal law new workforce
policy that entails additional federal
expenditures.
There are lessons to be learned from
these experiments because they operated
under many similar environmental
constraints relating to difficult labor
market conditions, severe federal and
state budget constraints, and contentious
governmental relations.
The UI Experiments: Policy Proposals
and Legislation
Between 1986 and 1996, eight UI
Experiments were conducted, searching
comprehensively for new or improved
interventions that might expedite
workers’ return to work and improve

their work skills. The interventions tested
were intensive job search assistance
(JSA), training, relocation assistance,
reemployment bonuses, self-employment
assistance (SEA), and an enhanced UI
work test.
The New Jersey Experiment was
a multitreatment project that tested
four interventions: 1) comprehensive
job search assistance, 2) training,
3) relocation assistance, and 4)
reemployment bonuses. The other
experiments tested only one intervention:
comprehensive JSA (District of Columbia
and Florida), self-employment assistance
(Massachusetts and Washington),
reemployment bonuses (Pennsylvania
and Washington), and an enhanced UI
work test (Maryland).
Six of the experiments provided
promising results that were developed
into policy proposals (see Table 1). The
comprehensive JSA from the New Jersey
Experiment was used as the foundation
for launching the Worker Profiling
and Reemployment Services (WPRS)
system enacted into federal law in 1993.
Later that year, SEA was temporarily
enacted based on the interim report of
the SEA experiment that had operated in
Massachusetts. The SEA program was
made permanent in 1998, after the final
SEA evaluation was published. In 1994,
reemployment bonuses were incorporated
into the Clinton administration’s
proposed Reemployment Act—a
reauthorization of federal workforce
legislation—but the legislation stalled
in Congress and was never enacted. In
2003 and 2005, reemployment bonuses
reemerged as a Bush administration
legislative proposal in the form of
Personal Reemployment Accounts.
The remainder of this article focuses
on two interventions discussed in the
book—comprehensive JSA and SEA—
where positive experimental results
guided the design of federal legislation
and produced successful programs that
help the unemployed return to work.
The Case of Comprehensive Job
Search Assistance
A series of reemployment experiments
were proposed to Bill Brock after he
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Table 1 The Unemployment Insurance Experiments: Evaluations and
Legislative Activity
Intervention

Experiment

Evaluation

Legislation

1989—Final report
1991—Four-year follow-up
1995—Six-year follow-up

1993—Worker Profiling and
Reemployment Services
(enacted)

Job search
assistance

New Jersey

Self-employment
assistance

Massachusetts 1991—Interim report
1995—Final report

1993—Self-Employment
Assistance (enacted for five
years)
1998—Self-Employment
Assistance (permanently
enacted)

Reemployment
bonuses

Illinois
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Washington

1994—Reemployment Act
(not enacted)
2003 & 2005—Personal
reemployment accounts
(not enacted)

1987—Final report
1989—Final report
2002—Final report
2002—Final report

NOTE: Most of the data and final reports from these experiments are available at ERDC on our
Web site: www.upjohn.org.

became Secretary of Labor in April
1985. Brock had been Special Trade
Representative and was familiar with
the issue of worker dislocation. He
eagerly approved a budget proposal
to launch a set of experiments dealing
with dislocated workers, but he insisted
that the New Jersey Experiment begin
immediately using existing research
funds rather than wait for a new
congressional appropriation. Believing
strongly in research, Brock firmly
supported initiating the experiments,
though he knew he would not oversee
their completion as secretary.
The New Jersey Experiment was
conducted in 1986 and 1987, and the
final evaluation was completed two years
later (Corson et al. 1989). The evaluation
showed that comprehensive JSA reduced
UI-compensated durations by half a week
to all workers offered the treatment. The
treatment resulted in a finding that the
cost of providing the services would
be more than offset by the benefits to
the government. If policymakers were
convinced by the evaluation report,
comprehensive JSA could be provided
with a federal budgetary savings.
The findings from the 1989 evaluation
and a series of multiyear follow-up
reports were widely circulated. Briefings
were held in Washington, DC, for each
of the evaluation reports. The reports
were distributed to state workforce

6

agencies, researchers, policy analysts,
and policymakers. At a 1991 briefing of
minority and majority staff members of
the House Ways and Means Committee,
all members agreed that the experimental
evaluation results were convincing and
that comprehensive JSA was highly cost
effective.
In March 1993, less than a month after
becoming the Secretary of Labor, Robert
Reich was faced with high unemployment
requiring the extension of emergency
UI benefits. In response, he wanted to

For research to affect policy,
political leaders in both the
executive branch and Congress
must commit to funding,
conducting, and using research.

when she was legislative assistant to
Representative Sander Levin, who
served on the House Ways and Means
Committee.
Clinton approved the proposal,
and Congress enacted the extension
of emergency benefits with the JSA
provisions with bipartisan support.
Clinton signed the legislation into
law on March 4, 1993. Now the
Labor Department was charged with
implementing this new program in the
states.
With unprecedented support from
three key department programs—the UI,
Employment Service (ES), and training
programs—the WPRS system was
successfully implemented nationwide
by mid-1996. A newly developed
worker profiling statistical mechanism
allowed state UI programs to identify
UI beneficiaries who were permanently
displaced and likely to exhaust their
UI benefits. Targeted workers were
referred to One-Stop Career Centers
where ES workers provided them with
reemployment services, and some of
these workers were referred to training
programs.
In recent years the WPRS system has
screened 6–12 million UI beneficiaries
and has referred over 1.0 million of these
UI beneficiaries to the One-Stops to
receive WPRS reemployment services.
The WPRS system works as both a
targeting tool to identify workers in
need of reemployment services and as
an allocation tool to effectively provide
these services consistent with state and
local workforce budgetary constraints.
Self-Employment Assistance

do something innovative. Cognizant of
the results of the New Jersey experiment
from her time as UI Administrator,
Carolyn Golding, the acting assistant
secretary for the Employment and
Training Administration, suggested he
consider comprehensive JSA. Larry Katz,
Reich’s chief economist, supported the
proposal—he had read the New Jersey
Experiment evaluation and had used it as
a reading for his Harvard graduate labor
economics class. Reich’s chief of staff,
Kitty Higgins, supported the proposal,
having been briefed on the experiment

SEA was tested in Massachusetts,
providing self-employment allowances
to UI-eligible workers in lieu of regular
UI benefits. This intervention also
was found to provide net benefits to
the Department of Labor. SEA was a
fundamental change in the way that
UI benefits are paid. While regular UI
requires that unemployed workers search
for wage and salary employment, the
SEA program relaxes that requirement
and allows workers to draw benefits as
long as they are laboring full time to
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start their own businesses. Unemployed
workers create their own jobs by starting
microenterprises, and they may employ
other workers as well.
SEA was the other UI Experiment that
both yielded a Clinton administration
legislative proposal and was enacted
into federal law. SEA is a voluntary
state program that must be adopted by
individual states and made a part of their
state UI laws. Less than a dozen states
have adopted the program, and usage has
been limited to a few thousand workers
a year. Nevertheless, the SEA program
holds promise as a practical option for
some workers to create their own jobs
and, based on experimental results, to
earn more money than workers who are
not offered this option.
Conclusion
Rigorous research can have a major
impact on federal workforce public
policy and legislation. For research to
affect policy, political leaders in both
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the executive branch and Congress must
commit to funding, conducting, and using
research. Implementing research findings
requires that government workers at
the national, state, and local levels be
supportive of the research results and
use them to develop new and innovative
programs and processes. When
policymakers use research results as a
prominent ingredient in policymaking,
they are more likely to develop costeffective policy that works. However,
when the research is not conducted or the
research results are ignored, policy and
programs suffer.
WPRS and SEA are success stories.
WPRS helps expedite the return to
work of dislocated workers. The Obama
administration and Congress recognized
this contribution by including $250
million in Recovery Act funds for
reemployment service grants that have
provided funds to provide comprehensive
JSA. While the SEA program needs more
encouragement and more entrepreneurial
training funds to expand its scope, its

success in the states with SEA programs
demonstrates the promise of permitting
unemployed workers to create their own
jobs and to increase their earnings by
starting their own microenterprises.
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